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Global Trade Governance and the Challenges of African
Activism in the Doha Development Agenda
Negotiations
DONNA LEE
This article develops a bottom-up approach to global trade governance and explains how
subordinate states are able to develop resistance strategies to top-down processes in the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). It highlights the growing activism and influence of
African states in the global governance of international trade through a case study of the
involvement of African states in the current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) nego-
tiations. In so doing, it presents new evidence of the role played by non-dominant states
in shaping and contesting the rules and practices of contemporary global trade govern-
ance. The article also provides theoretical insights into the source of African resistance in
the WTO by drawing attention to the role of discourse in contemporary global trade gov-
ernance. In this case study the analysis focuses in particular on how subordinate African
actors make use of prevailing discourses of development to hold major powers and the
WTO to account for their public commitment to negotiate new trade rules that will
deliver development. It underlines the extent to which subordinate actors tend to use
what is available to them—in this case the discourses of dominant actors—to challenge
existing power structures. The conclusion reached is that African resistance creates an
African dilemma; while resistance to existing power processes means that African
member states can no longer be ignored in WTO negotiations, it also means that the
WTO as a forum for global governance is less effective since consensus-based agreement
becomes more difficult to achieve. And the less effective the WTO is in multilateral trade
governance, the more member states—and in particular dominant states—ignore the
WTO and seek bilateral and regional alternatives in order to secure market opening.
Introduction
There is no real crisis in world trade of the macro and micro economic sort that is
evident in the global financial system, as discussed in several of the articles in this
special issue.1 Recently released world trade figures demonstrate that throughout
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the first half of 2010 the value of international trade grew at a healthy rate, some
25% higher than in 2009. Developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East
experienced growth in the value of their exports of around 35% or more, as a result
of both increased demand and a rise in commodity prices.2
This growth, however, has taken place in a context in whichmultilateral govern-
ance of world trade is fragile, if not in some sort of crisis—particularly the pro-
cesses of global governance that create market opening. In contrast to the surge
in international cooperation and renewed efforts at global financial governance
that followed the financial crisis in 2008, the relatively healthy state of global
trade has induced a state of growing apathy with regard to global trade govern-
ance in many states—particularly the developed states. Moreover, other forms
of trade governance, notably bilateral free trade agreements, have proliferated,
and as World Trade Organisation (WTO) multilateral talks in Geneva have contin-
ued to stall, this has created a sense of, at best, irrelevance of the multilateral
process in member state capitols and, at worst, a sense of a systemic failure of mul-
tilateral trade governance in theWTO’s headquarters andmember state trademis-
sions in Geneva. In sum, the recent growth in world trade has taken place largely
as a result of growing bilateralism and regionalism rather than effective multila-
teralism and it would appear that the WTO has become less relevant to the
major trading states than the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
system it replaced. This article offers some thoughts on the extent of this crisis
of multilateral governance in world trade by focusing on the role that new
players in the multilateral trade negotiations process have played in the continued
delay of the current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) round of talks. In particu-
lar, the article focuses on the emergence of African states as key protagonists in the
DDA talks. While attention has been paid to the challenges to the WTO system
from the shift in power in the global political economy, and especially the
impact of the rise of Brazil, India and China—the so-called “BICs”3 —few have
considered the impact of the increased activism of African states in the organis-
ation and global trade governance.4 This focus on the BICs is understandable
given the increasing market power that these rising powers now enjoy in the
global economy. But the BICs are not the only new kids on the block in Geneva.
The African states—most of which are least-developed countries—have also
become more active and embedded in the WTO negotiating process. Yet this
1. James Brassett and Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Crisis is Governance: Sub-prime, the Traumatic
Event, and Bare Life”, Global Society, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2012), pp. 19–42; Liam Clegg, “Post-crisis
Reforms at the IMF: Learning to be (Seen to be) a Development Partner?”, Ibid., pp. 61–81; Manuela
Moschella, “IMF Surveillance in Crisis. The Past, Present, and Future of the Reform Process”, Ibid.,
pp. 43–60; Lena Rethel, “This Time is Different! The Shifting Boundaries of Emerging Market Debt”,
Ibid., pp. 123–143.
2. WTO, “Trade Value Still up by about 25% in the First Half of 2010”, Press Release, 1 September 2010,
available:,http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres10_e/pr614_e.htm. (accessed 9 September 2010).
3. Russia is not a member of the WTO and so I use “BICs” rather than the more recognised “BRICs”.
For detailed analysis of the role of the BICs see Amrita Narlikar, “New Powers in the Club: The
Challenges of Global Trade Governance”, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3 (2010), pp. 717–728.
4. For detailed analysis of Africa in the WTO see Michael F. Jensen and Peter Gibbon, “Africa and the
WTO Doha Round: An Overview”, Development Policy Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2007), pp. 5–24; Donna
Lee, “Bringing an Elephant into the Room: Small African State Diplomacy in the WTO”, in Andrew
F. Cooper and Tim M. Shaw (eds.), The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 195–206; Richard E.Mshomba,Africa and theWorld Trade Organization






























has not been fully captured by the literature on global trade governance. Indeed,
as Ian Taylor points out, there is too little attention being paid to Africa in the more
general international political economy (IPE) literature.5 When Africa is included
in global governance and IPE debates, the analysis tends to focus almost exclu-
sively on the impact of global governance and the international political
economy on African countries and the continent.6 Here I offer an alternative,
inverse analysis that focuses instead on how African states, concerned about the
increasing unequal distribution of the benefits of market opening, can shape the
processes and outcomes of global trade governance.
The global trade governance literature has also failed to fully explore the use of
discourses by subordinate actors to resist dominant players in international organ-
isations like the WTO. Social constructivist approaches remind us of the crucial
role discourses can play in international relations, though they tend to suppose
that prevailing discourses serve dominant state purposes only.7 Recently,
Rorden Wilkinson has discussed the role of discourse in the WTO as a tool of
the dominant powers and non-state elites within the global trade system as a
way of illustrating the social processes at work in securing top-down, asymmetri-
cal agreements in global trade.8 In this article, however, I invert the predominant
method used by others. Rather than seeing agency and dominant discourses as the
exclusive weapons of the strong, I highlight instead how dominant discourses can
become “weapons of the weak”.9My purpose is to explore how subordinate actors
(in this case least-developed African states) have made use of the discourse of the
dominant states (in this case a discourse of development) in the WTO as a means
of challenging and resisting the power of the dominant states. The central point I
wish to make is that the contestation process does not entail challenging the domi-
nant development discourse in search of a counter-hegemonic discourse, but
rather it involves weak actors (in a structural sense) using the discourse to hold
powerful states accountable for their trade behaviour. I develop this bottom-up
approach to the role of discourse in global governance from earlier work by
Jason Sharman on peripheral states in the system of tax havens.10 By deploying
Sharman’s methodology, I can highlight the ways in which African states are
able to make use of the prevailing discourse of development in the DDA—a dis-
course initiated and advanced by the major states—to resist a multilateral trade
agreement that falls short of their expectations of what is promised in the
5. Ian Taylor, “Globalisation Studies and the Developing World: Making International Political
Economy Truly Global”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 7 (2005), pp. 1025–1042.
6. For a full discussion of this point see Will Brown, Sophie Harmon, Stephen Hurt, Donna Lee and
Karen Smith, “New Directions in International Relations in Africa”, Roundtable: Commonwealth Journal
of International Studies, Vol. 98. No. 402 (2009), pp. 263–267.
7. For an excellent review of these literatures see Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global
and European Politics: A Review Essay”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2004), pp. 229–
244.
8. RordenWilkinson, “Language, Power andMultilateral Trade Negotiations”, Review of International
Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2009), pp. 597–619.
9. A phrase I borrow from James C. Scott’s Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). See also Jason C. Sharman, “The Agency of Peripheral
Actors: Small State Tax Havens and International Regimes as Weapons of the Weak”, in John
M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (eds.), The Everyday Politics of the World Economy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2007), pp. 45–62.
10. Sharman, op. cit.





























development discourse. Thus the dominant discourse of development becomes a
source of subordinate state resistance in the DDA and a key factor explaining the
delay and deadlock in the negotiations. Thus, while states such as Kenya, Burkina
Faso, Uganda and Egypt maymay lack market power, they make up for this struc-
tural subordination by using discursive power in their attempts to resist dominant
states in the WTO.
Since the launch of the DDA, African states have insisted that major powers
deliver on their public commitment to development. When development issues
have been sidelined in, for example, the market access (NAMA) negotiations or
by European and Japanese attempts early in the negotiations to place the so
called “Singapore issues” onto the agenda,11 African states (along with other
developing and least-developed countries) have vetoed agreement.12 I provide
new qualitative evidence to support the argument that the resistance was trig-
gered and aided by discursive factors. I use WTO documentation as well as
data from a series of interviews with African missions in Geneva and Brussels,
and non-state actors based in Geneva who work with, and support, African
WTO member states from organisations such as the South Centre and the Inter-
national Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), as well as offi-
cials from the WTO, the African Union, and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).13 My purpose is to demonstrate growing
least-developed country activism in the WTO and suggest that it is a significant,
though certainly not the only, factor in the continuing delay and frequent deadlock
in the Doha Round. I limit my analysis to an explanation of why it is that these
subordinate states have become participants in the WTO system in the last
decade. It is too premature to examine the effectiveness of this activism until
we know the details of the endgame.
The article is structured as follows. I begin by analysing the DDA deadlock and
the ways in which scholars have sought to explain this deadlock, before going on
to suggest an alternative approach, one based on a focus upon the agency of non-
dominant actors, as another way of explaining the impasse in the DDA. I then
highlight evidence of growing African agency in the DDA, focusing on the
factors that explain the emergence and development of an enhanced willingness
and capacity of some African states to engage with and contest current global
trade governance processes in the WTO. Having highlighted African agency as
a key element of the current DDA talks and why the talks are in stalemate, I
then explore the significance of this activism to current global trade governance.
The conclusion reached in the final section is that African resistance creates a
dilemma for these subordinate states. While resistance to existing power processes
means that African member states can no longer be ignored in WTO negotiations, it
means that the WTO as a forum for global governance is less effective since
11. There are four trade-related issues that are referred to as the “Singapore Issues”: government pro-
curement, investment, competition and facilitation.
12. For a detailed discussion of the diplomatic strategies of African states in the DDA see Donna Lee
andNicki Smith, “Small State Discourses in the International Political Economy”, ThirdWorld Quarterly,
Vol. 31, No. 7 (2010), pp. 1091–1105; Lee, “Bringing an Elephant into the Room”, op. cit.
13. The author held 24 open-ended interviews during March 2010, June 2010 and July 2011 with
various officials based in African missions in Geneva and Brussels, as well as officials from the
African Union, the WTO, UNCTAD and key non-governmental organisations who work with the
Africa Group in the WTO. These interviews were conducted on the basis that interviewees would






























consensus-based agreement becomes more difficult to achieve. And the less effec-
tive the WTO is in multilateral trade governance, the more member states—and in
particular dominant states—ignore the WTO and seek bilateral and regional
alternatives in order to secure market opening, leading to what Sharman calls
“institutional Darwinism” in global governance. That is, competition between
various forms of trade governance—bilateralism, regionalism and multilateral-
ism—with the prospect that only the fittest (most effective) will survive.
Deadlock in the DDA
It is not possible in an article of this size to provide a detailed account of the course
of the negotiations and a blow by blow narrative on the occasions when the talks
have stalled. Instead I simply highlight that most high-level meetings of the Doha
talks have ended in deadlock and, as a result, even though the member states have
been negotiating for 10 years, a DDA agreement is far from completion. We should
not underestimate the task in hand. The membership is large (over 150) and the
trade and trade-related issues under discussion are broad and contentious;
members have been trying to reach a multilateral agreement to create market
opening for agricultural and manufacturing goods, trade in services (GATS)
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property. It is not an exaggeration to
say that the Doha Round has chiefly been in deadlock and has been marred by
a series of failed WTO ministerial meetings, some very spectacular such as the
so-called “Collapse of Cancun” in 2003.14 And while others produced some pro-
gress, for example the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, they were
quickly followed by impasse in the DDA negotiating committees as delegates
sought to unpack the details of the Hong Kong Declaration on ending agricultural
subsidies by 2013.15 The negotiations following the Hong Kong meeting proved
hugely difficult and it was not long before further deadlock in the talks, mainly
over agricultural subsidies, arose at the July 2006 Geneva meeting after which
the Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, called for a suspension of the
talks. A further high-level meeting in Potsdam in June 2007 also ended in dead-
lock, with the issue of developed country agricultural subsidies again the main
sticking point. Although Doha meetings resumed in Geneva in July 2008 (as a
result of discussions among elite nations at the 2007 meeting of the World Econ-
omic Forum), these talks lasted only nine days and collapsed in the absence of
meaningful progress on the issue of developed country agricultural subsidies as
well as conflict over special safeguard measures.16 The subsequent failure to
14. For detailed analysis of the Cancun ministerial meeting see Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkin-
son, “Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun Post-mortem”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2004),
pp. 447–460.
15. For a detailed analysis of the negotiations up to and including the Hong Kong Ministerial see
Donna Lee and Rorden Wilkinson (eds.), The WTO after Hong Kong: Prospects for, and Progress in, the
Doha Development Agenda (London: Routledge, 2007).
16. Special safeguard measures are a tariff mechanism that protects poor farmers by allowing some
developing countries and least-developed countries to set a tariff when prices fall or when imports
surge. For details see James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, “What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain
from the Doha Development Agenda (DDA)?”, Paper presented at the conference “Ten Years of the
‘War against Poverty’: What Have We Learned since 2000; What Should We Do 2010–2020?”
Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of Manchester, 8–10 September 2010.





























break the Doha impasse at a meeting in Geneva in December 2009, when once
again developing and least-developed countries continued to insist on a meaning-
ful development content to any DDA agreement, highlighted once again the dif-
ficulties in reaching a multilateral trade deal.17
Despite the fact that the Doha Ministerial Declaration, setting out the content of
DDA, makes explicit mention of the need to give special consideration to the
needs of developing countries,18 James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, in a detailed
analysis of the Doha Round from a development perspective, argue that the
“development content of the Round has been whittled away over the course of
the negotiations”.19 At a meeting of trade ministers in late January 2011, Pascal
Lamy was able to obtain agreement that the Doha Round would be completed
in 2011. The likelihood of this seems remote. With the United States demanding
more market access to developing countries at that meeting, and developing
countries responding that the US should offer more in special safeguards in agri-
cultural trade to protect their poor farmers, the North–South stand-off in the DDA
continues.20 Given the resistance of developing and least-developed countries to
an agreement without significant development content, there seems little prospect
of an endgame to the Round as it enters its second decade of negotiations.21
Certainly the view often expressed by officials working in and around the WTO
in Geneva when asked about the likelihood of completion of Doha is a pessimistic
one. Many of the government and WTO officials interviewed in the summer of
2010 spoke repeatedly of their frustrations with the negotiating process and the
social impact of the continued failure of the DDA talks. Some described the city
as something of a ghost town and lamented, “there is nothing going on here”.
Mission officials talked of trade delegates returning to their capital cities to
“renew their careers” and “find more significant trade policy work”. WTO offi-
cials talked about the need to move on to work in other organisations “where
there was more happening”. Not that the WTO as an institution can do much
about the current deadlock. As a member-driven institution with a relatively
small secretariat, it lacks the political, judicial and administrative means to
compel the member states to complete the Round. Instead it is reduced to repeated
appeals by the Director General for re-engagement and renewed political will
from member states.22
17. For detailed discussion of the development content of the DDA negotiations see Scott and Wilk-
inson, “What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain”, op. cit.
18. “Ministerial Declaration. Adopted on 14 November, 2001”, WTO, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, 20
November 2001.
19. Scott and Wilkinson, “What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain”, op. cit., p. 12.
20. The Hindu, “WTOMembers for Concluding the Round 2011”, 9 January 2011, available: ,http://
www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/article1137855.ece. (accessed 11 February 2011).
21. The WTOwebsite provides a useful timeline of the DDA negotiations, available: ,http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiations_summary_e.htm.. For more detailed discussion of
the course of the DDA negotiations from a developing country perspective written by the head of
the South African trade delegation in Geneva, see Faisal Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organisation:
Developing Countries in the Doha Round (Jaipur: CUTS International and Friederich Ebert Stiftung, 2009).
See also James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, “What Happened to Doha in Geneva? Re-engineering the
WTO’s Image while Missing Key Opportunities”, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 22, No.
2 (2010), pp. 141–153.
22. Most of Pascal Lamy’s recent speeches are attempts to create newmomentum in the negotiations.






























When asked about the causes of the impasse, African officials unsurprisingly
talked repeatedly of the need for major states to “deliver on their development
promises” in the DDA negotiations. This sense of expectation of, or even entitle-
ment to, development is also evident in many formal submissions to the WTO
by African states and the Africa Group. In 2006, for example, following the
release of the Draft Ministerial Text (more commonly referred to as the “Derbez
Text”) at the Cancun ministerial meeting in September 2003,23 the Kenyan del-
egation to the WTO Committee on Trade and Development submitted a detailed
critique of the proposals outlined in the Text on behalf of the Africa Group. It con-
cluded that “the proposed decisions will not confer any economic benefits on
developing countries, much less facilitate their integration into the multilateral
trading system. They are framed in language which would not oblige developed
countries to take positive measures to increase market access opportunities for
developing countries.”24
Some of the African officials working in Geneva talked repeatedly, when inter-
viewed, of a reluctance to complete the Round without significant development
commitments. One official stated: “We are not unreasonable negotiators. All we
have been insisting on in the committees is that others keep to the development
agenda we all agreed to when we launched the new Round in 2001. Even when
commitments on issues related to our development are agreed during the nego-
tiations, they get forgotten later on.” Formal communique´s submitted to the
WTO by the Africa Group during the negotiations support these views. For
example, in 2006 the Africa Group issued a communique´ to a special session of
the WTO Committee on Agriculture which quoted Paragraph 55 of the Hong
Kong Ministerial Declaration, a section containing an explicit commitment that
members would address the “particular trade-related concerns of developing
and least-developed countries related to commodities in the course of the agricul-
ture and NAMA negotiations”.25 A common theme of the interviews was that
African officials believed that developing countries had a “legitimate right” to
expect a Doha agreement to deliver development; “Why call it a development
round otherwise?”, one asked. Clearly, African hopes were raised by the language
and norms of development written into the Doha Declaration.
Explaining the DDA Deadlock
Deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations is nothing new. The GATT had long
been a venue for stalemate in multilateralism before it was replaced by the
WTO.26 Although scholarly attention has been paid to the continuing deadlock
23. The “Derbez Text” is available on the WTO website: ,http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min03_e/draft_decl_rev2_e.htm..
24. “Analysis of the Twenty Eight Specific Proposals, Communication by Kenya on Behalf of the
Africa Group”, WTO, TN/CTD/W/29, 9 June 2006, p. 25.
25. ”Modalities for Negotiations on Agricultural Commodity Issues. Proposal Submitted by the
Africa Group to the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture”, WTO, TN/AG/GEN/18, 8
June 2006.
26. See Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade (London: Routledge,
2006). See also John W. Evans, The Kennedy Trade Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the
GATT? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) for further details of deadlock in the
GATT in the 1960s.





























in the current DDA talks,27 no-one has yet concluded that the challenges this poses
for the WTO are fatal. Most analysis sees the continued breakdown as either an
opportunity for reform of the WTO system—particularly its decision-making
process28—or as a diplomatic mechanism for agreeing a series of minor conces-
sions that generally satisfies most member states, but fails to produce substantive
changes to international trade regulation.29
Almost without exception, explanations of the deadlock use a top-down
approach, highlighting the shifting structural factors and in particular the emer-
gence of new major powers in the international trade system. These positivist
approaches frame the problem using familiar global governance themes such as
order and disorder, balances of power and fragmentation, hierarchy and
chaos.30 The new global trade governance landscape is presented as a complex
and numerous set of strategic alliances that includes perhaps a dozen or so
states as major powers with diverse, often conflicting trade interests in the
WTO. This disordered and fragmented system replaced the more ordered and
balanced system of the early GATT regime that was dominated by a small
number of developed states whose trade interests and ideas were fundamentally
compatible, and who were able to impose a multilateral agreement on an essen-
tially compliant and relatively small GATT membership.31 In contrast to this hier-
archical early GATT system, the WTO has, since its inception in 1995, generally
lacked these ordering and cohesive structural mechanisms. Instead it hosts a
larger and more unwieldy number of powers in the global economy such as
China, India and Brazil,32 as well as a host of powerful coalitions of states such
as the Group of Twenty developing countries (G20).33 Central to this argument
27. Peter Collier, “Why the WTO is Deadlocked andWhat Can Be Done about It’, The World Economy,
Vol. 29, No. 10 (2006), pp. 1423–1449; Lee and Wilkinson, op. cit.; Amrita Narlikar and Peter Van
Houten, “Know the Enemy: Uncertainty andDeadlock in theWTO”, in Amrita Narlikar (ed.),Deadlocks
in Multilateral Negotiations: Causes and Solutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
pp. 142–163; John Odell, “Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO,
Seattle and Doha”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 273–299; Wilkinson, The
WTO, op. cit.; The Warwick Commission, The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? (Coventry:
University of Warwick, 2007); Alasdair R. Young, “Transatlantic Intransigence in the Doha Round:
Domestic Politics and the Difficulty of Compromise”, in Narlikar, Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations,
op. cit.
28. See in particular Narlikar, “New Powers in the Club”, op. cit.; The Warwick Commission, op. cit.;
Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organisation, op. cit.
29. See Wilkinson, The WTO, op. cit.
30. See, for example, Jennifer Clapp, “The WTO Agriculture Negotiations and the Global South”, in
Lee and Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 37–55; Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita, “The Balance of Power
in WTO Decision-making: Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative Response”, Aussenwirtshaft, Vol. 59,
No. 2 (2003), pp. 171–214; Joost Pauwelyn, “The Transformation of World Trade”,Michigan Law Review,
Vol. 104, No. 1 (2005), pp. 1–69; Amrita Narlikar, “The Ministerial Process and Power Dynamics in the
World Trade Organisation: Understanding Failure from Seattle to Cancun”, New Political Economy, Vol.
9, No. 3 (2004), pp. 413–428; Amrita Narlikar, “New Powers in the Club”, op. cit.; Robert Hunter Wade,
“The Ring Master of Doha”, New Left Review, Vol. 25, January–February 2004, pp. 146–152. For more
general discussion of the role of power politics in WTO negotiations, see also Peter Drahos, “When
the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the WTO”, International Negotiation, Vol. 8, No. 1
(2003), pp. 79–109; Jeffrey J. Scott (ed.), The WTO after Seattle (Washington, DC: Institute for Inter-
national Economics, 2000); Richard Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-based Bar-
gaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO”, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002), pp. 339–
374.
31. For full discussion of this see Bernard. MHoekman andMicheal M. Kosteki, The Political Economy






























is that WTO deadlock results from a lack of order and authority in the deliberative
process; no one member, or duopoly of members, or strategic coalition has suffi-
cient power and authority to impose an agreement. Put simply, authority and
market power in the contemporary global economy is now too dispersed to
enable a member state-driven institution such as the WTO to effectively govern
multilateral trade. Moreover, in this more anarchic structure, the major
powers—including the fast developing states—have conflicting views on the
priorities of trade liberalisation. Positivist approaches focus on this ideational
contestation and structural anarchy to explain the fractious DDA negotiations.34
Critical approaches have long highlighted the diversification of interests and
unequal power structures in the WTO and, using an equally top-down approach
to deadlock, point to the emergence of developing country coalitions that have
embedded a North–South dynamic into the WTO and the DDA.35 This North–
South conflict pits previously dominant developed member states such as the
US and members of the European Union (EU) against increasingly assertive and
active alliances of developing countries such as the G20. At the heart of this
North–South conflict are the differing demands of the US and EU for liberalising
measures to open up access to developing country markets in new areas such as
services and government procurement, and the resistance of increasingly assertive
developing countries who use their emerging market power to forefront their
chief concerns with implementation issues.36 Thus the emergence of a North–
South fault line as the central conflict in the DDA negotiations is seen as the key
factor explaining the continued impasse in the global governance of multilateral
market opening.37
While structural shifts are important factors in explaining the problems of
achieving agreement in the DDA negotiations, an exclusive structural approach,
whether from a critical or liberal perspective, loses sight of significant questions
in global governance such as how we understand the growing influence of non-
compliant least-developed states like Benin and Chad in, for example, the DDA
cotton negotiations—a trade issue that has been a headline topic in the talks
since the tabling of the Cotton Initiative in 2003.38 Chad and Benin have almost
no market power and thus no structural power in the international political
economy compared to other resistant developing country member states in the
32. For detailed discussion of these new developing country powers in the WTO see Narlikar, “New
Powers in the Club”, op. cit.
33. For details of the G20 in the WTO see Ian Taylor, “The Periphery Strikes Back: The G20 at the
WTO”, in Lee and Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 155–168.
34. Andrew Hurrell and Amrita Narlikar, “The New Politics of Confrontation: Developing Countries
at Cancun and Beyond”,Global Society, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2006), pp. 415–433; Amrita Narlikar and Brendan
Vickers (eds.), Leadership and Change in the Multilateral Trading System (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009).
35. See Clapp, op. cit.; Ian Taylor, “The Periphery Strikes Back”, op. cit.; Amrita Narlikar and Diana
Tussie, “The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their Evolving Coalitions in
the WTO”, The World Economy, Vol. 27, No. 27 (2004), pp. 947–966.
36. Lee and Smith, “Small State Discourses”, op. cit.
37. See Faisal Ismail, Reforming the World Trade Organisation, op. cit.; Bhagirath Lal Das, The Current
Negotiations in the WTO: Options, Opportunities and Risks for Developing Countries (London: Zed Books,
2005); Kevin P. Gallagher, “Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round”,
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2008), pp. 62–85.
38. Donna Lee, “The Cotton Club: The Africa Group in the WTO”, in Lee and Wilkinson, op. cit.,
pp. 137–154. See also Elinor L. Heinisch, “West Africa versus the United States on Cotton Subsidies:
How, Why and What Next?”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2006), pp. 251–274.





























WTO such as India and South Africa, and yet they are able to resist attempts by
major powers to impose a DDA. The Cotton Initiative is one example of how
states, considered by structural approaches as weak and subordinate, contest
and construct WTO processes. Such examples show that in not addressing the
agency of some of the least-developed states, structural approaches are missing
interesting and significant elements of global trade governance and perhaps fail
to fully explain deadlock in the DDA.
Not all positivist approaches focus on structure at the expense of agency in
explaining the DDA impasse. Drawing on rational choice theory, and in particular
game theoretic approaches to negotiations, Amrita Narlikar and Peter van Houten
argue that the continued deadlock in the DDA negotiations is best explained by
uncertainty (caused by imperfect information) between the developed countries
and the developing countries regarding the claims made by each in the nego-
tiations, as well as uncertainty about the “true” and the “revealed” preferences
of each. Game theoretic approaches argue that agency-level informational and sig-
nalling issues stifle the negotiations and create deadlock which cannot be broken
until “uncertainty about mutual goals and bottom-lines” is overcome.39
The emergence of strategic coalitions compounds the “signalling of interests”
problem in the DDA since their unstable nature multiplies the uncertainty
problem for negotiating partners who must try to judge the legitimacy and
strength of the claims and preferences signalled by the leaders of the coalition.
Thus, Narlikar and van Houten argue, the deadlock in the DDA is best explained
by uncertainty over the economic preferences of the “unknown South”—
unknown because coalitions of the South such as the G20 have, at different
periods in the negotiations, been weak (at the Geneva Ministerial in 2006) and
strong (at the Cancun Ministerial in 2003); they have been cohesive on some
issues (such as cotton) but also divided on others (non-agricultural market
access).40 Central to rational theory approaches is the assertion that agency in
negotiations is individualistic and that activism in the WTO—whether by weak
or dominant actors—is driven by utility-maximising values and rational
motives alone. Deadlock in the DDA, according to this approach, is assumed as
a rational response by member states to the information available to them about
possible welfare gains and costs before, and during, the negotiations.
Game theoretic approaches suppose rather than demonstrate that states
always behave in utility-maximising ways in the WTO system on the basis
that the economic interests of states are self-evident. Yet as constructivist scholars
of international relations remind us, interests are themselves constructed more
broadly by social, political and cultural conditions as well as by economic con-
ditions.41 We should not suppose that agency in WTO negotiations always
involves utility-maximising actors. It can include, as I demonstrate below,
norms and discursive practices that inform the expectations of member states
about the WTO regime, multilateral trade negotiations and the actual trade be-
haviour of states. My argument is that African resistance to dominant states’
market opening demands in the DDA may well be a normative and principled
39. Narlikar and van Houten, op. cit. See also John Odell, Negotiating the World Economy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2000); John Odell (ed.), Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and
NAFTA (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
40. Narlikar and Van Houten, op. cit., p. 148.






























response to dominant powers that is informed by their (African) social, economic
and political expectations of how they can secure development in the WTO
regime. In sum, agency has normative, discursive and social elements and we
should not suppose that it is always driven by rational economic motives.
In what follows, I argue that deadlock and delay in the DDA agreement are
explained, in part, by discursive practices in the WTO. Discursive practices in
the DDA around development and global economic governance led by domi-
nant states served to raise African expectations of an entitlement to develop-
ment, and a collective African anticipation that the global economic
institutions such as the WTO would deliver the developed countries’ promise
of development. In the Doha Round, African agency is not exclusively utility
maximising or individualistic. Neither, I argue, are least-developed and develop-
ing African states entirely weak and vulnerable (as structural approaches argue),
or purely utility maximising (as game theoretic approaches suppose). Rather,
they are “won’t do” countries, to use a phrase coined by Robert Zoellick, the
US trade representative at the WTO Cancun ministerial meeting.42 These
countries have used the discourse of development championed by dominant
states, as well as their experiences of negotiations with these states, to better
“resist on the red letter issues” as one interviewee in Geneva stated, even if
this means that agreement will not be reached. This collective resistance of sub-
ordinate states to dominant states based on discourses of development has
been a significant factor in a prolonged period of institutional deadlock in multi-
lateral trade governance.
Africa in Global Trade Governance
We have learnt to ask why, we have learnt to ask how, and we have learnt
to say “No”.
(Interview with an African delegate to the WTO in Geneva, June 2010)
Traditionally, African states, when considered at all, are seen as a problem to be
addressed by global economic governance and as recipients of global economic
governance rather than the shapers of global economic policies and processes.
This is particularly the case with small African states whose least-developed econ-
omies and scant market power, it is assumed, leaves them unable to meaningfully
contribute to a decision-making environment like the WTO where large market
power matters. Prevailing conceptualisations of global governance see African
and other least-developed countries as marginal actors in global economic govern-
ance regimes such as the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank, the G20 Finance Ministers and the World Economic Forum.43 Indeed, the
experience of most African countries as they engage with these institutions is
42. Robert B. Zoellick, “America Will Not Wait for the Won’t Do Countries”, Financial Times, London,
22 September 2003, p. 15. For a previous detailed analysis of the “won’t do” strategy of developing and
least-developed countries in the DDA, see Lee and Smith, “Small State Discourses”, op. cit. Note that
this Lee and Smith article focuses on the discourses of smallness rather than the discourses of develop-
ment in order to analyse the influence of small states in the international political economy.
43. See, for example, Roman Grynberg (ed.),WTO at the Margins: Small States and the Multilateral Trade
System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).





























one of economic dependence and political marginalisation. In the case of the
WTO, however, African engagement is now direct and central to the current
Doha Round of negotiations.44
Before the establishment of the WTO, African countries enjoyed very little, if
any, influence in multilateral trade governance. Although most African countries
were members of the GATT,45 histories of the eight multilateral trade rounds con-
ducted during the GATT period (1948–1995) indicate that African member states
were largely absent from these negotiations. Although recent work by Wilkinson
and Scott argues that developing countries such as India, Cuba, Chile, South
Africa and Brazil were active participants in the GATT, their analysis does not
include least-developed African countries, so we can assume that they were not
active participants.46
In contrast to their relative passivity in the GATT, African countries have
become active in the WTO. There is much evidence of the active involvement of
African states in the WTO, including the large number of proposals submitted
by African states and the Africa Group,47 the appointment of African delegates
as Chairs of negotiating committees, the regular meetings of the Africa Group
in Geneva, and the leadership of other coalition groups by African states (such
as Mauritius’s position as coordinator of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
Countries [ACP] group and Zambia as coordinator of the Least Developed
Countries [LDC] group).
How is it that African states have become more active in the WTO during the
Doha Round negotiations? There are at least three reasons that explain this acti-
vism. First there is the “weapon of resistance” provided by the discursive turn
that prioritises “development” and “fairness” in the context of market opening
objectives. Second is the consensus-based decision-making process in the WTO
that provides a mechanism for resistance by enabling African states to say “no”.
Third are the various ways in which the deliberative capacity of African states
has been enhanced during the DDA so that they are better able to “ask why”
and “ask how” in the DDA process. This is most striking in the more developed
states such as Kenya and Egypt, but it also includes several least-developed
states such as Burkina Faso and Rwanda.48
Development Discourses and African Activism
While least-developed countries may lack market power due to the small size and
scale of their economies, they have discursive power as a result of a decisive discur-
sive turn in global economic governance at the beginning of the new century. This
44. Lee, “Bringing an Elephant into the Room”, op. cit. For an alternative view that sees low levels of
African engagement in the Doha Round see Jensen and Gibbon, op. cit.
45. Most African countries becamemembers of the GATTas colonies of the signatory states. Member-
ship simply entailed the extension of GATT rights and obligations to African countries rather than any
active participation in GATT negotiations. For details see Mshomba, op. cit.
46. Rorden Wilkinson and James Scott, “Developing Country Participation in the GATT: A Reassess-
ment”, World Trade Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2008), pp. 473–510.
47. See Joseph Senona, Compilation of the Formal African Proposals to the WTO (Harare: SEATINI;
Midrand, South Africa: Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005).
48. It should, however, be remembered that many least-developed states still have inadequate






























discursive turn placed development firmly at the top of the agenda of various global
governance regimes. A series of events beginning with the November 1999 WTO
ministerial meeting in Seattle, and including the United Nations Millennium
Summit in September 2000which adopted a set of “Development Goals”, provided
a very powerful development steer for the WTO that found its way into the Doha
Ministerial Declaration in November 2001. Cumulatively they created what
Michael F. Jensen and Peter Gibbon call a “heightened role of moral argument”.49
These developments heralded a collective global responsibility for development
to reducepoverty in the least-developed states of theworld.50Developing countries,
including African states, have been able to challenge the major powers in theWTO
to deliver on development throughout theDDAnegotiations on the basis of this col-
lective steer on development. The dominant discourse of development opened up
opportunities for African states to say “no” to any agreement that did not include
meaningful development outcomes. This is seen particularly in the cotton nego-
tiations, which quickly became an acid test of the commitment of the US in particu-
lar to advance the interests of the poorest farming communities inWest and Central
Africa by reducing domestic subsidies to American farmers. Given the symbolism
of the cotton issue in theDDA, theAfricaGrouphas statedmore than once that there
will be no completion of the DDAwithout an agreement on cotton.51 Having sig-
nalled that the current Doha Round would place the needs of the developing
countries at the centre of the work programme, the legitimacy of the WTO system
of global governance, as well as the reputation of the powerful states that dominate
the regime, now rests on ameaningful development outcome. Previously, the legiti-
macy of the global governance of trade rested on its remarkable success at reducing
tariffs and generating growth in global trade. Few contest the effectiveness of global
trade governance in achieving this, but trade liberalisation as an end in itself is no
longer sufficient. Since the emergence of the discourse of development, the
success of the WTO now rests on its ability to govern trade in a more equitable
and fair way to create development for the poorest countries in the international
system and reduce poverty among the poor communities in the world. The preva-
lence of a development discourse, with its normative appeals to fairness, has been a
key factor in facilitating the activism of least-developed African countries during
the DDA.
Jason Sharman notes that weak states can appropriate the rhetoric of strong
states to even up the imbalance of structural power between them.52 The WTO
development discourse provides opportunities for least-developed states to
challenge the powerful states by using the language and vocabulary of fairness
that the dominant states have directly introduced into the WTO. For example,
the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in 1995 placed the develop-
ment needs of the least-developed states at the forefront of the new organis-
ation. The development language in the Agreement was often quoted in the
formal submissions by African states to the various negotiating committees
in the two months just before the suspension of the DDA negotiations in July
49. Jensen and Gibbon, op. cit., p. 5.
50. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
51. Lee, “The Cotton Club”, op. cit.
52. Sharman, op cit.





























2006.53 As discussed above, African officials use the language of development
when talking about their expectations and experiences of the DDA.
Consensus Decision Making and African Activism
It is customary in theWTO tomake decisions by consensus even though, in theory,
a voting system is in place. This means that, in practice, weaker states can, if they
are willing, veto multilateral agreement. Each formal WTO negotiating body
reaches agreement by unanimity and as such “no-one’s objections can be
ignored”.54 Even though the practice of so-called “Green Room” meetings con-
tinues, and is evidence of the importance of market power in the WTO,55 this is
seen as “irrelevant if an elite negotiated and drafted the text as long as every
member can express his consent or dissent regarding the draft”.56 Non-objection,
however, is not the same as setting the agenda and while Africans have become
more active in the WTO and successful in resisting the top-down imposition of
an agreement, they have also been frustrated in their attempts to obtain agreement
on substantive policy changes in many areas and especially in the agriculture
committee and sub-committees.
While it is important that African states can veto Green Room decisions because
of the existence of the consensus rule, it does mean that the specific policy interests
of those not in Green Room are placed on the DDA agenda without other forms of
intervention. Furthermore, African absence in the formal negotiating committees
(as opposed to the informal Green Room process that cannot claim legitimate
decision-making powers) amounts to non-objection in the way that the consensus
rule is applied; this is because member states have to be present at the negotiating
committee meeting, council meeting or ministerial meeting to veto decisions. To
take full advantage and to develop engagement strategies beyond saying “no”
from the openings provided by the “development” discursive turn and consen-
sual decision-making processes at the WTO, African states have had to enhance
their deliberative capacities during the Doha Round to ensure they have
enough “bums on seats” at formal meetings, and to ensure that those present
have some technical expertise and knowledge of trade issues. Some—though by
no means all—African states have met this challenge. And in this process of
capacity building, the development of the Africa Group coalition has facilitated
the sharing of limited resources to ensure an African presence in the WTO
meeting rooms.
53. See, for example, the following Africa Group submissions: ”Analysis of the Twenty Eight Agree-
ment Specific Proposals. Submission by Kenya on behalf of the Africa Group”, WTO, TN/CTD/W/29,
9 June 2006; “Communication from the Africa Group. Operationalizing Technical Assistance and
Capacity Building in Trade Facilitation”, WTO TN/TF/W/56, 22 July 2005; “Review and Clarification
on the Green Box. Communication by the Africa Group”, WTO TN/AG/GEN/15, 6 April 2006; “Com-
munication from Benin on behalf of the Africa Group. Implementation the Technical Assistance and
Capacity Building and Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) Mandates of Annex D of the July
2004 Framework”, WTO TN/TF/W/95, 9 May 2006.
54. James Tijmes-Lhl, “Consenus and Majority Voting in the WTO”,World Trade Review, Vol. 8, No. 3
(2009), p. 420.
55. For details of the Green Room process see Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at
the WTO: The Real World on International Trade Negotiations; The Lessons of Cancun, updated ed. (London:
Zed Books, 2004).






























Enhanced Negotiating Capacity as a Source of African Activism
African members’ more effective involvement in the Doha Round negotiations has
been augmented as a result of a combination of a number of capacity-building
factors. Providers of training and technical assistance have included traditional
state-based organisations such as the WTO, UNCTAD, the African Union, and
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), as well as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the ICTSD, Oxfam, the Advisory
Centre in WTO Law (ACWL), and South Centre.57
Although some of the African Mission officials interviewed in Geneva in
March and June of 2010 seemed wary of WTO support, the take-up of WTO
training programmes for African delegates is high, especially among least-devel-
oped countries. The Development Division of the WTO spends 30% of its budget
on training courses for African member states, and also provides interns to
African missions to enhance their capacity in Geneva, as well as a full-time
staff African Group coordinator who organises meetings and retreats for
African States.58
African states have been quite shrewd in exploiting the support offered by other
trade-related international and NGOs based in Geneva. There is an extensive
range of supportive organisations that share and champion the development
goals of least-developed countries, creating a widespread social and political
network in Geneva to enhance the deliberative capacity of some of the most
resource-starved missions. It is important to recognise the way in which African
states use this non-elite network to empower themselves in the DDA negotiations.
African officials in Geneva spoke of the practice of seeking technical information
and intelligence from these organisations as a starting point. They also mentioned
that they often seek advice onwritingWTO submissions and proposals. One inter-
viewer claimed, for example, that UNCTAD had assisted African states in drafting
Africa Group proposals on agriculture and NAMA, and that Oxfam had assisted
African states in drafting Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) pro-
posals. NGO staff who workwith African missions in Geneva claimed that the 2003
Cotton Initiative submitted by the so-called Cotton Four (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad
and Mali) was authored by a leading member of staff from a partner NGO also
based in Geneva. It is an open secret in Geneva that the ACWL writes African
and other developing country proposals—largely because it has spare capacity
due to the limited engagement of developing countries in the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism (DSM).59
Not only have African states used these organisations to enhance their capacity,
they have also made normative use of them in their discursive practices in the
negotiations. Oxfam, for example, is used by African states according to some
African delegates in order to develop what they called the “Crying Game” strat-
egy in the cotton negotiations. Oxfam’s detailed research into the relationship
between US cotton subsidies and poverty in African cotton-farming communities
was a key document that informed the Cotton Initiative and helped the Cotton
57. Interviews with African officials in African missions, the African Union, as well as staff from the
ICTSD, South Centre, UNCTAD, Geneva, March and June 2010.
58. Interview with WTO officials, Geneva, March 2010.
59. Interviews with African officials in African missions, the African Union Mission as well as staff
from the ICTSD, South Centre, UNCTAD, Geneva, March and June 2010.





























Four gain normative traction in the ensuing cotton negotiations.60 Oxfam was also
instrumental in influencing the publication of editorials in major US newspapers
supporting African positions in the cotton negotiations.61
African states have also helped themselves by developing means of collective
coordination and the sharing of resources to enhance their capacity to engage in
the DDA, most notably through the development of a so-called “Focal Point”
system in the Africa Group and the LDC Group in the WTO.62 This involves a
large number and wide range of African states including Kenya, Nigeria,
Morocco, Egypt, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Zambia and Rwanda, who each take a
lead in each of the negotiating committees and ensure that Africa has a presence
and influence across the DDA negotiations. This system is seen as a particularly
effective way of making the best use of limited capacity within the Africa
Group and the LDC Group, where most least-developed states have very small
missions in Geneva.63 The focal system is, however, more than a simple
resource-sharing process. It is also, according to several participants I interviewed,
an important social system where officials meet with each other and share experi-
ences of the negotiating process. It is an “African space” in Geneva where they can
celebrate the successful interventions some may have had in committees, or
discuss their failures with each other. The focal point system provides shared
African opportunities for understanding the negotiating process and sharing
ideas about how they might better influence that process.
Another development in capacity building, one that is mission based rather
than collectively based, has been the tendency among most African states since
2006 to increase the number of officials working in their missions in Geneva.
Using the 2006 and 2009 WTO Staff Directories as a guide, we can see that
states such as Burkina Faso and Kenya have more than doubled the size of their
Missions.64 That said, enhanced capacity in Geneva is often achieved by simply
shifting staff from capitols or Brussels to work at the WTO.65 It was interesting
to experience first-hand the very stark contrast in the relatively high staffing
levels of some African missions in Geneva compared to the low staffing levels
found in the same country missions in Brussels. Clearly some least-developed
African countries have been forced to prioritise engagement in the multilateral
negotiations in the DDA over bilateral or regional trade negotiations with the
EU. Despite most African missions enjoying enhanced resources, staffing levels
are still at a minimum in a number of least-developed countries such as
Zambia. Continuing capacity issues seem to be a particular problem for franco-
phone states, according to some WTO officials, and these states struggle to
engage effectively in the DDA according to a number of delegates and officials
interviewed on this subject in Geneva.
60. Oxfam, “Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Subsidies on Africa”, Briefing paper No. 30
(London: Oxfam, 2002).
61. Lee and Smith, “Small State Discourses”, op. cit.
62. Interviews with officials from African missions, Geneva, March and June 2010.
63. For example, Cape Verde, Namibia and Tunisia have just one representative in Geneva. Data from
WTO Directory, March 2009.
64. In the Kenyan Mission, the staffing levels rose from four in 2006 to eleven in 2009. In the Burkina
Faso Mission, staffing levels also rose from four in 2006 to eleven in 2009, making their GenevaMission
the same size at that of Brazil and South Korea. See WTO Directory, 2006 and 2009 (Geneva: WTO).






























Finally, a further way in which African states have enhanced their capacity to
effectively engage in the Doha Round talks has been through coordination with
other developing country coalitions such as the G20, the G33, the NAMA 11,
the ACP, and the Like Minded Group, using the development discourse as a
way of building collective action among members. Coordination with these
groups has enabled the Africa Group to focus its more limited resources on
issues not covered by these groups (such as cotton) or piggy back on the proposals
submitted by these groups, such as NAMA. According to some commentators and
delegates, coordination with other groups has generally proved quite easy. This is
because the very size of the Africa Group—one of the largest coalitions in the
WTO—makes it an attractive strategic partner in negotiations.
The added value of all this capacity-building activity is that previously invisible
African states have become more important to the process and form of current
WTO negotiations and thus global trade governance as a whole. This has been
well documented in recent research into, for example, the cotton and TRIPs nego-
tiations.66 Africa has learnt to say “no” and enhanced its capacity to effectively
engage in the DDA negotiations. In July 2008, when the prospects for completion
of the DDAwere as promising as they had ever been, the African issue of cotton
was one of only two issues (the other being the special safeguard mechanism)
from a list of 20 so-called “critical issues” not resolved at the ministerial
meeting.67 The Africa Group have repeatedly stated that without an agreement
on cotton there will be no final DDA deal though, as others have pointed out,
the negotiations could have also floundered on a number of key issues for least-
developed countries, including the special safeguard mechanism, market access
for less developed countries, geographic indicators, tropical products and
bananas.68
A focus on the role that African states have played in the continued deadlock in
the DDA negotiations tells us many things, not least that African activism can no
longer be ignored. The problem, however, is no longer one of ensuring that African
voices are heard in the WTO, but whether anyone is there to listen. Perhaps the
crisis of multilateral trade governance is that the WTO can be, and is being,
ignored and in the last decade has seemingly become less relevant to major
trading nations.
The Dilemma of African Activism
The Doha Round is already the longest multilateral trade round in the history of
multilateral trade governance. The delay in completing the DDA seems to have
increased the appetite of some member states to pursue bilateral and regional
alternatives to trade governance. For the US, Australia and the EU in particular,
the WTO is not the “only game in town”. And what Sharman refers to as “insti-
tutional Darwinism”69 now seems to characterise trade governance in the
66. Lee, “Bringing an Elephant into the Room”, op. cit.; Mshomba, op. cit.
67. Scott and Wilkinson, “What Have the Poorest Countries to Gain”, op. cit., pp. 13–14.
68. See Faisal Ismail, “An Assessment of the WTO Doha Round July–December 2008 Collapse”,
World Trade Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (2009), pp. 579–605; Scott and Wilkinson, “What Have the Poorest
Countries to Gain”, op. cit.
69. Sharman, op. cit., p. 52.





























international system. That is, the WTO is competing with regional trade agree-
ments and bilateral trade agreements in international trade rule-making. Major
developed country governments—who account for a majority of the value of
world trade—have been actively pursuing bilateral and regional free trade and
investment agreements in order to open up existing and new markets for some
time.70 In an environment where suitable alternatives to multilateral trade agree-
ments exist and aremore quickly achieved, the political commitment of developed
countries to the Doha Round is, not surprisingly, somewhat diluted.
Although African states are also increasingly involved in bilateral and regional
trade agreements with major markets, particularly Europe and increasingly
China,71 these are less likely to produce the level of development possible in mul-
tilateral trade agreements. This is because the negotiations usually involve classic
structural conditions of weak states trying to negotiate with the strong (conditions
that I have argued are mitigated by the existence of a prevailing development dis-
course in the WTO), and outcomes rarely exact the kinds of concessions that
African countries are demanding in the current Doha Round. In fact, the conces-
sions are often termed “WTO Plus” since they go beyond the WTO’s market
opening agenda.72
The dilemma for African states is that their increased activism, along with that
of other developing countries, has raised the level of North–South contestation
over the trade rules and processes governing global trade policy and has failed
to generate sufficient agreement in areas of trade policy to complete the DDA.
The continued deadlock in the DDA has frustrated everyone, including major
trading states such as the US, the EU and China, who now seem less inclined to
be as active in pursuing multilateral solutions to market opening as they are bilat-
eral and regional solutions. The surge in developing country engagement with
global trade governance in the last decade has, it could be argued, created a
counter-surge in bilateral and regional efforts at trade governance, and as a
result the WTO appears to be less significant to contemporary international
trade governance.
Conclusion
By highlighting new forms of African governance with an analysis of the Africa
Group as a major protagonist in the current WTO multilateral trade talks, this
article has demonstrated that African states can impact global economic govern-
ance (even in instances where they lack structural power relative to developed
states). This raises interesting epistemological and ontological questions about
our approach to studying Africa, global governance and the international
70. For details and analysis of the growth in bilateral and regional trade agreements, see Ann Capling
and Patrick Low (eds.), Governments, Non-state Actors and Trade Policy Making: Negotiating Preferentially
or Multilaterally? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto
V. Fiorentino, “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements”, WTO Discussion Paper
No. 8 (Geneva: WTO, 2005); Adrian G. Flint “The End of a ‘Special Relationship’? The New EU-ACP
Economic Partnership Agreements”, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 36, No. 119 (2009),
pp. 79–92.
71. Crawford and Fiorentino, op. cit.; Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagements in Africa: Scope, Signifi-
cance and Consequences”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2006), pp. 459–479.






























organisations that are meant to do the global governing. Shining a light on African
activism in theWTO and the key role discourse plays in the emergence of this acti-
vism shows the intellectual value to be gained by adopting a bottom-up approach
to global trade governance. Such an approach can first recognise and then analyse
the impact of non-elite actors such as least-developed African states on global
trade governance processes. In the case of the WTO the impact has been consider-
able, perhaps even critical, since it has added to the mechanics of deadlock in
the negotiations and this in turn has encouraged states to seek alternatives to
multilateral trade governance. The deadlock in the DDA has highlighted the
institutional weaknesses of the WTO, the weak political commitment to develop-
ment among the developed countries, and the continuing absence of a collective
commitment to fairness in global trade governance. African and other developing
country activism during the Doha Round negotiations has made deadlock the
standard rather than the exceptional circumstance in the WTO over the last 10
years. Although deadlock was a feature of the GATT system, it was never the
default condition. As a result, Washington and other developed country capitals
appear to be shifting their political commitment to diplomatic alternatives to
secure trade growth. Global trade governance is thus in something of a crisis,
even at a time of growth in the value of global trade.
Global Trade Governance and African Activism 101
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